ceives when that child is in a state institution. Habilitation consists of education and training for those who are mentally retarded.' This Note argues that habilitation decisions for mentally retarded children in residential care are best made by their parents, and not by public employees, such as mental health workers, as is the current practice. Respecting parental authority in this area will serve the same societal goals as in the traditional areas over which parents retain decisionmaking power in relation to their children. This Note suggests that the current limitations on parental habilitation decisionmaking are unconstitutional. The Note also sets forth a standard, supported by current mental health policy, as well as by current constitutional norms, which ensures that parents have a role in deciding the treatment their institutionalized child will receive. Parental authority can be accorded full effect through incorporation in state statutes of a standard such as the one this Note proposes.
I. CURRENT STATE OF HABILITATION DECISIONMAKING
Legally and medically, habilitation has been broadly defined. Habilitation is the application of professional services to help a mentally retarded person make maximal use of his capacities so he will function more effectively. 7 Retarded persons have a constitutional right to an amount of habilitation which requires "the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint." Habilitation can include choices among educational options; 9 medical treatments, such as psychotropic drugs; 10 and various kinds of behavior 6. For a full definition of habilitation, see infra note 7 and accompanying text. For legal discussions of habilitation, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1982) (habilitation's principal focus is on training and development of needed skills); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 n.2 (1981) (habilitation consists of "education and training for those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not ill"). Lower federal courts have more closely followed the medical definition, which emphasizes the maximization of the retarded person's capabilities. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 , 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1978 ("'Habilitation' is the term of art used to refer to that education, training and care required by retarded individuals to reach their maximal development."), affid and modified, 612 F. 2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) , rev 'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) .
8. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) . 9. An important educational option relates to language development because a retarded person's progress towards independence is greatly affected by his ability to communicate. Bennett, Reviewing an Individual Habilitation Plan: A Lawyer's Guide, 4 U. ARK. LrrTL ROCK L.J. 467, 480 (1981) . Decisions relating to language development include whether a retarded child should be taught to speak or should be trained in alternative methods of communication, such as a language board. Id.
10.
Psychotropic drugs are substances used for the express purpose of producing behavioral, emotional, or cognitive changes. Aman, Psychoactive Drugs in Mental Retardation, in TREATMENT Is-SUES, supra note 7, at 455. Pharmacotherapy is employed with the retarded in the hopes of both Behavioral Approach to Retardation, in BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 17-18 (T. Thompson & J. Grabowski eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as BEHAVIOR MODIFI ATION] ("Behavior modification attempts to teach individuals the specific skills they have failed to learn earlier-skills which help them to function more effectively, enjoy wider experiences, and put them in a position to continue learning other valuable skills."). But see P. RosEN, M. CLARK & S. KpvrI, supra note 7, at 24 (" [B] ehavior modification techniques often represent radical departures from traditional habilitation efforts, although the same habilitative goals certainly apply."). i
Richmond & Martin, Punishment as a Therapeutic Method with Institutionalized Retarded
Persons, in, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, supra note 11, at 467, 485. Richmond and Martin note a number of significant problems with response-contingent electrical stimulation: (1) the use of "punishing electrical stimulas can be dangerous if administered carelessly"; (2) if used inappropriately, the technique can generate undesirable results; (3) "the need for long-term follow up requires that the equipment be set aside for a specific resident for months, or even years." Id. at 485-86, 491.
13.
Overcorrection "incorporates several basic learning principles: extinction (immediate termination of the inappropriate behavior and its accompanying reinforcement), timeout (removal of general reinforcement for a period of at least several minutes), and punishment (instruction and guided practice in a restitutional or related activity requiring some physical effort 175-78 (1978) (use of overcorrection therapy required profoundly retarded woman to brush her teeth with mixture of lemon juice and hot sauce because she drank prescribed mouthwash during pretreatment sessions); Richmond & Martin, supra note 12, at 485 ("severe abuses of overcorrection occur all too often" as result of "the vague nature of the procedure" and tendency of some staff members to use "excessive coercive force").
14. In behavior modification, "punishment" is generally defined as an event following a maladaptive behavior which will lead to a rapid reduction of the behavior in question. Azrin & Holtz, Punishment, in OPERANT BEHAVIOR 234 (W. Honeg ed. 1966) . The punishment element of overcorrection is also termed "aversive consequences." Ferretti & Cavalier, A Critical Assessment of Overcorrection Procedures with Mentally Retarded Persons, in TREATMFNT ISSUES, supra note 7, at 241, 243.
A. The Problem: Excluding Parents
The extent and seriousness of parent's lack of control over habilitation decisions are manifest in litigation seeking to deinstitutionalize or improve the treatment of retarded individuals who receive residential care. The plaintiffs in these cases have complained at length about the lack of institutional response to parental requests for modifications in the treatments of patients."" The lack of institutional response has sometimes led to tragic results.' 7 This absence of parental control is not remedied by the current deinstitutionalization movement. 1 " Although deinstitutionalization has helped retarded persons,' 9 it alone will not solve all the problems associated with the treatment of retarded children, and parents of a retarded child may still be denied the power to make habilitation decisions when the child is placed in a small residential setting rather than a larger institution. 20 Cir. 1979 ) (parents of retarded child communicated child's sensitivity to phenothiazane, a major tranquilizer, but drug was administered anyway, possibly in "a calculated effort" to control behavior of child, causing convulsive spasms and hemorrhaging).
18. Deinstitutionalization is the important trend away from placing or maintaining retarded persons in large institutions in favor of a multi-faceted community-based system, which allows retarded persons to be served by programs and in residences in as normal a way as possible. V. BRADLEY Deinstitutionalized residential care is commonly provided in various kinds of community-based arrangements, which include community residences and intermediate care facilities. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In a community residence, which is often a single family dwelling with four to fourteen clients, clients are supervised either by live-in house parents or by a rotating staff. Id. The intermediate care facility is similar to a community residence, but provides greater supervision for clients with more substantial medical and behavioral needs. Id.
19. See PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 4, at 130 (main thrust of deinstitutionalization not just to move retarded people out of institutions but to provide quality alternatives to institutions). Deinstitutionalization may also help minimize the problems of stigma and isolation faced by mentally retarded persons. V. BRADLEY, supra note 18, at 5. 20. A survey of group homes of varying sizes found that "institution-oriented management patterns prevailed. . . regardless of the size of the facility." S. BERcovicI, BARRIERS TO NORMALIZA-TION: THE RESTRICTVE MANAGEMENT OF RETARDED PERSONS 141 (1983). Other problems were deed, deinstitutionalization may create some new difficulties and dangers" that make necessary continuing parental decisionmaking.
B. Current Law Regarding Habilitation Decisions
Federal and state laws currently employ a variety of legal standards, some of which are not entirely clear in intent or meaning, to assign decisionmaking power over the habilitation of retarded children in state institutions.
Federal Law: The DDA
Many of the federal statutes that help handicapped persons also assist the mentally retarded. 2 2 Of these, one suggests the imposition of a legal burden on states to consult with parents in making habilitation decisions: The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDA). 2 " State facilities accepting financial allocations under the DDA must meet its standards relating to the services that people with developmental disabilities receive. The DDA gives parents "where appropriate" a role in developing the individual habilitation plan (IHP), which is required for each mentally retarded individual in a state facility. 2 5 The legislative history of the DDA found in the group homes included in this survey: (1) small group homes, despite prior expectations, were more custodial in some ways than the larger facilities; (2) certain features of the group homes "reinforce thinking and behavior on the part of the retarded individual that are not adaptive when the individual is in noninstitutional settings"; (3) the general quality of the environment at the facilities varied widely; (4) the program goals and methods of the majority of the facilities "could only be seen as adhering to an implicit corrective-detentive model which, by its nature, is non-normalizing"; (5) an "institution-oriented practice of depersonalization" occured to some degree at all the facilities. Id. at 141-45.
21. See V. BRADLEY, supra note 18, at 10 ("In their haste to decentralize the system of care for developmentally disabled persons by shifting the emphasis away from large, state-run programs, some states have lost their ability to ensure adequate accountability for the well-being of those receiving
Neufeld eds. 1977) ("No social movement has been inititiated with such abruptness or so little planning as has been deinstitutionalization.").
22. For example, 400,000 retarded people receive Supplemental Security Income and 250,000 receive Social Security payments under 42 U.S.C. § § 402(d), 403 (1982 the Supreme Court examined the bill of rights provision of the DDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982) , and concluded that nothing in the Act or its legislative history suggested that Congress intended to require the states to provide "appropriate treatment" for mentally retarded citizens in the "least restrictive environment." The Court contrasted the Bill of Rights section, which expressed congressional preference, with sections that were conditions for the receipt of federal funding, such as § 6011. Id. at 13. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 195-205 (D.N.H. 1981) while requiring habilitation plans, fail to specify any need for a parental role in their development. 32 State statutes that do mention a general need for consulting with parents," 3 or for giving them some kind of opportunity § 71.20 (1975) ; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 51.47 (West Supp. 1984 -1985 .
See
32. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 27.10.5-113(1) (1982) ("Each resident shall have an individualized treatment plan formulated" and "reviewed semiannually" by "professional persons."); GA. CODE ANN. § § 37-4-2(9), -4-20, -4-122 (1982) (parent of minor child may apply to have child examined by "comprehensive evaluation team," and if majority of team concludes child needs "specialized services other than that which he is then receiving," team will recommend individual program plan for child); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-1.6-7 (Bums 1983) ("All patients or clients are entitled to be informed of the nature of the treatment or habilitation program proposed"; adult clients may refuse to submit to program and involuntary patient may petition court or hearing officer for consideration of program; "In the absence of such petition, the service provider may proceed with the proposed treatment or habilitation program."); ME. (West 1982 ) ("The treatment facility shall devise a written program plan for each person which describes in behavioral terms the case problems, the precise goals, including the expected period of time for treatment, and the specific measures to be employed" and which "shall be devised and reviewed with the designated agency and the patient"); MONT. CODE (4) for participation, 4 leave it to state employees to decide when and how parents should be involved. 35 The Connecticut statute, for example, contains broad language that requires the attending physician of any institutionalized child to obtain "informed consent" from the parents of any unemancipated resident under eighteen years of age before "any medical treatment." 3 6 The practice in this state, however, is to obtain parental consent only when lifethreatening medical treatments are to be performed on institutionalized children.1 7 Thus, in Connecticut as in other states, the extent of a parent's right to control treatment decisions is limited. (1984) (habilitation plan not required, but parents given right "to initiate a hearing on matters relating to the initiation, change, or termination or the refusal to initiate, change, or terminate the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a [handicapped] child"); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.13(b) (1979) (In causing "written treatment plan" to be prepared or revised, "the patient or an authorized representative, to include the parent or parents if the patient is a minor, shall be interviewed and provided an opportunity to actively participate in such preparation or revision.").
35. The language of the statutes that do specify a need for some kind of parental involvement provide an easy escape for the state official who does not want to involve any given parent-he need only decide that it is not "appropriate" to involve them or that he can not do so with any "reasonable effort." And, of course, these statutes leave the extent of participation by parents to the discretion of the official. Cf. Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center. v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. 365, 368 n.3 (D.N.H. 1981 ) (staff members who feel "best interests" of resident warrant overturning of guardian's refusal to agree to placement decision do so).
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The commissioner of mental retardation shall require the attending physician of any person placed or treated under his direction to obtain informed written consent from the following persons prior to authorizing any surgical procedure or any medical treatment, excluding routine medical treatment which is necessary to maintain the general health of a resident or to prevent the spread of any communicable disease: (1) The resident if he is eighteen years of age or over or is legally emancipated and competent to give such consent; (2) the parent of a resident under eighteen years of age who is not legally emancipated; or (3) the legal guardian or conservator of a resident of any age who is adjudicated unable to make informed decisions about matters relating to his medical care. 37. Conversation with George Doyle, Director of Social Services, New Haven Regional Center, Department of Mental Retardation for the State of Conn., Apr. 12, 1984 . Connecticut has, however, granted the parents of mentally retarded residents of the Mansfield Training School, a large institution for the mentally retarded, "a primary role" in the placement decisionmaking process following a consent decree to reduce the population of the clients at this school. Consent Decree, Connecticut Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Thorne, Civil No. H-78-6534 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 1983) .
38. The exception to this general pattern may be Texas. See Tx. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300 ( § 18) (Vernon 1982) ("Whenever possible, the client or the parent of a minor. . . . shall be given ent's wishes for his child have less weight than those of the state employees who are assigned to the child's treatment team. These employees, by having the discretion to decide the scope of parental involvement, have the power to decide the habilitation that an institutionalized mentally retarded child will receive.
C. A Narrower Definition of Habilitation
In order to set clear limits on the scope of authority of both the state and the parents, this Note narrows the general definition of habilitation. The proposed definition sets an age limit for those on whose behalf habilitation decisions are made and excludes certain kinds of decisions from the ambit of habilitation plans, which set long-term goals and short-term objectives for the child. 9 Parental habilitation power should be restricted to choices made on behalf of children who are legal minors. When a mentally retarded individual reaches the age of majority, there should be a hearing at which parents, if they choose, can petition to continue as their son's or daughter's legal guardian. 4°A lthough "health" is an "ambiguous state about which doctors and pa--tients may have conflicting expectations," 4 routine minor health care demands no more than those noncontroversial procedures performed routinely to maintain a general level of physical well-being." 2 A decision to treat a minor cut with antiseptic and an adhesive bandage, for example, does not belong within the scope of an individual habilitation plan. At the other extreme, but also excluded by this narrowing of habilitation, are emergency situations involving non-terminally ill children."' In this type of situation, when obtaining parental permission would take time during which the child's life might be seriously impaired, on-the-spot medical the opportunity to decide among several appropriate alternative services available to the client ... "). Vol. 94: 1715 Vol. 94: , 1985 personnel need the authority to act promptly." Habilitation decisions should also be defined so as to disallow the choice of procedures that are not generally accepted medically. 45 The state, while sometimes unable to interfere with these procedures in other circumstances,' 4 is not obliged to be the instrument by which they are delivered.
Finally, parental control over non-emergency life and death decisions raises different questions than parental control over a habilitation plan.4 7 As such, these decisions require a different framework than does habilitation.' 8 II. HABILITATION Macdin eds. 1982) ("Our society places a high value on human life, and we tend to be repelled by the thought of granting any third party, even a parent, the power of life and death.").
48. Compare In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (1976) , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (father of severely brain-damaged woman could exercise daughter's right to privacy against bodily intrusion by authorizing removal of artificial life support only upon mandatory involvement of family, attending doctor, and hospital ethics committee); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 757-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (1977) 651, 670 (1977) (parents sue on behalf of children punished by disciplinary paddling, but public school teachers allowed to inflict "such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline of the child"); infra text accompanying notes 116-20. 50. See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state.").
51. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents have interest in raising children elements because they involve choices among types of academic and vocational training for the child. 52 They contain medical elements because they utilize medical science to help maximize a child's potential. 3 Finally, these decisions relate to a child's social development because they include training in such areas as the use of leisure time and the ability to interact socially in an appropriate manner."
For the same reasons parents control a child's education, medical treatment, and socialization, they should make habilitation decisions. Parents make child-rearing decisions because of (a) their own unique qualifications to do so; (b) the state's incapacity to make these sensitive decisions; and (c) the stake our society has in diversity, which prevents the state from standardizing its citizens. The EHCA grants parents the right "to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." id. § 1415(2)(b)(1)(E) (1977) . It also sets up a detailed procedure for hearing complaints. Parents have "an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency or by the local educational agency or intermediate educational unit." Id. § 1415(b)(2). Appeal from findings and decisions rendered in this hearing can be made to the State educational agency which is obligated to "conduct an impartial review" of the hearing. Id. § 1415(c). Appeal from the decision of the state educational agency can be made by bringing a civil action in any state court of competent jurisdiction or in a federal district court. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
The EHCA does not, however, specify the weight parental wishes are to be given. 
A. Parents' Qualifications to Protect the Child's Best Interests
While the interests of parents and children may sometimes conflict, 55 our society generally allows, indeed expects, parents to assume responsibility for their children." 6 Parents are expected to evaluate and make judgments about the needs and requests of their children. This responsibility is theirs because most child rearing decisions require the knowledge of parents, rather than the professional expertise of specialists, 5 and because the natural bonds of affection generally lead parents to act in the best interests of the child. 58 Indeed, this bond between parent and child is of profound importance to the emotional life of both. 59 Our legal system enforces the societal assumption that parents should make child rearing decisions by granting parents the freedom to do so unless they are shown unfit and are disqualified at a formal proceeding comporting with due process requirements. 60 The mental condition or living situation of the retarded child in residential care does not render his parents unfit to protect the child's best interests. Suspicion of these parents appears to follow from their decision 59. See Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his offspring" and "[a] child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsive, reliable adult") (footnotes omitted); B. RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS 123-24 (1959) ("The family is important at the present day more through the emotions with which it provides parents than for any other reason."). to institutionalize their child," 1 but this decision is unrelated to any ability or inability to make habilitation choices. Parents often have no other choice than to turn to the state for assistance because of the substantial problems associated with keeping or caring for some retarded children at home. 62 Often they are forced to seek residential care for their child because of an unavailability of those community-based services which would allow the child to remain at home. 6 " The numerous lawsuits by parents seeking to improve their child's treatment in a state facility attest to the continuance of parental concern."
See

B. The State's Weaknesses as Decisionmaker
Parental choices require a sensitivity which the state, as an impersonal institution, cannot have. 65 Even well-intentioned social workers do not have to live with their decisions in the way parents do. 66 Mothers and fathers, after courageous struggles to care for their offspring at home, overwhelmed by lack of respite and assistance, felt compelled to turn ... to the state. They acted reluctantly in order to save a modicum of sane living for their families and because they believed the state could do more for their deprived youngsters than they could.
See also Luna, A Perspective, in CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 18, at 83, 84 (great amount of attention mother has to pay to her microcephalic child caused her and her other three children such emotional problems that she saw herself "on the edge of going berserk" and turned to state for assistance).
63.
See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. at 1337 (N.Y. State provides almost no funds to maintain clients in their own homes; parents testify "that they felt compelled to institutionalize their children or siblings because no community service or programs were available that would permit them to remain at home").
64. No social institution, regardless of how benevolent or paternalistic, can ever replicate the par-technical issues are only one of the factors which impinge upon habilitation decisionmaking. 6 " Habilitation choices must be based, in part, upon an individual's ethical, social or religious values. 6 " Finally, decisionmaking authority must be granted to parents to avoid the great potential for "discretionary injustice" 9 that exists when state officials, unchecked by outside review, choose among possible courses of action or inaction. 0
C. Diversity Among Citizens
Although Plato suggested communal child rearing for his Ideal Commonwealth and ancient Sparta entrusted its males to official guardians," 1 these ideas about the relation between individual and state are "wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest. ' 72 In America, the state cannot standardize its children. 73 Our society rests not on the "deep paternalism" of Plato or ancient Sparta but on a "liberal paternalism" that grants parents a general right to raise their children as they see fit."" Parents are granted this freedom to protect the pluralism upon which democracy depends. 68. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 664 ("[T]he law must recognize that it cannot find in medicine (or for that matter in any science) the ethical, political, or social values for evaluating healthcare choices.").
69. "Discretionary injustice" is a term Kenneth Culp Davis coined. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-TIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 218, 219 (2d ed. 1975) ("A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.").
70. Kenneth Davis writes that minimizing discretionary injustice is "the strongest need and the greatest promise for improving the quality of justice to individual parties in our entire legal and governmental system." Id. Giving 7 ' To do otherwise would give the state the power to standardize this group of our republic's citizens.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Parental rights are protected by substantive due process.
7 7 State infringement of a parent's due process rights is permitted only when the state's interest both outweighs the parent's rights and where there is a close correspondence between the state's interest and the actual means that the state employs.
7 1 Unlike equal protection analysis, which involves a rigid tier system,"' due process balancing involves a "flexible" approach. -The Family] . While the Supreme Court no longer uses a substantive due process analysis to protect economic rights, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (in most cases, law must be upheld unless facts "preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislature"), it continues to find certain family values "fundamental" and thus subject to heightened judicial scrutiny upon state intrusions. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental interest and statute that precludes parent who failed to comply with child support orders from marrying without court permission is subject to heightened scrutiny); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (marital privacy is "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system" and thus deserves heightened protection from state interference).
Developments
78. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 388 ("When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (due process clause requires that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved").
79. This rigid tier system has, however, become flexible enough to permit semi-suspect classifica-Although courts utilize ready-made tests in examining challenged state procedures tinder due process claims,"' no exact threshold divides the most minimal and the most exacting due process standards. Courts are supposed to weigh the balance of the interests involved. 8 2 The constitutional rights at stake in habilitation decisions are found in the interplay of three interests. First, there is the usual authority parents have over their children. Second, the retarded child has an individual liberty interest. Finally, the state has interests in the family and in managing its institutions. In deciding the nature of the interests involved in habilitation decisionmaking, courts must individually examine and balance them.
A. The Parents' Rights in the Family
Although the rights of parenthood are not without limits, the Supreme Court has declared that there is a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." 8 Within this realm, the boundaries of which have been neither consistently located nor firmly fixed," parents are protected 84. It is difficult to discover a consistent methodology behind the Supreme Court's decisions to place some parental activities within the protected realm and other activities outside of it. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state law requiring formal education after eighth grade invalid as applied because it would gravely hinder interest of Amish parents in raising their children in Amish religion and way of life), with Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (although practice of Jehovah's Witness religion involves public distribution of religious literature, state can prohibit children raised in this religion from engaging in activity). Either one of these cases can easily from state authority in making many decisions relating to family life. 5 Among the personal rights the Supreme Court has deemed "'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' there is "some extension" to child rearing. 88 The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family, according to the Supreme Court, "precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.
1 7 When a retarded child is placed for care in an institution, however, he has been removed from the structure of the traditional nuclear family-a decision that raises novel constitutional questions. Fortunately, other nontraditional family arrangements have received judicial examination. For example, some "families" that lack the presence of biological parents can be entitled to constitutional protection. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"" the Supreme Court found that extended families of uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents deserved protection from a restrictive city ordinance because " [O] urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family." '8 9 For a parent's interest in his child to reach a constitutional dimension, neither marriage nor current residence of the child and parent together are required: Unwed fathers who live apart from their children have a constitutional interest in their child if they have demonstrated a past commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood. 90 Furthermore, although the term "family" implies the existence of a biological relationship, the importance of the familial relationship to the indi- vidual involved and to society stems from "emotional attachments" as well as "the fact of blood relationship." 9 1
These cases suggest that a relevant principle can be derived from the family law decisions of the Supreme Court. This principle is that parents of mentally retarded children receiving residential care in a state facility are entitled to a protected "private realm of family life" if they are emotionally attached to the child and have shared the responsibilities of child rearing.
9 2 Parents who meet these standards and whose mentally retarded children are receiving residential care are entitled to constitutional protection for their habilitation choices; in addition, these parents are entitled to procedural due process if the state attempts to terminate their parental interests.
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B. The Child's Rights
Of the constitutional rights that belong to children, 9 the most critical one for a mentally retarded child is his liberty interest. 5 A mentally retarded child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in conditions Halderman v. Pennhurst, 707 F.2d 702, 714 (3rd. Cir. 1983 ) (Rosenn, J. concurring) ("careful judgment by loving and emotionally attached parents" entitled to "substantial weight" in proceeding concerning transfer of voluntarily committed, retarded minor child from state school to community living arrangement), affld without op., 723 F.2d 897, 723 F.2d 898 (3rd. Cir. 1983) ; Developments-The Family, supra note 77, at 1218 ("[P]rotected family relationships are defined not by objective factors such as formal marriage and blood ties, but rather by the degree to which they provide intimacy, support, and protection for individual family members.").
92. Cf. Halderman ex rel. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1983 ) (plurality opinion) (parents' constitutional right to direct and control upbringing and development of their minor children was not afforded sufficient consideration in proceeding in which parents' voluntarily committed, profoundly retarded minor child was transferred from state school to community living arrangement), aff d without op. 723 F. 2d 897, 723 F. 2d 898 (3d. Cir. 1983) .
93. See supra note 3. 94. Children possess first amendment rights, see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1975) ("[M] inors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection .
... "); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (schoolchild's wearing black armband to school in protest of governmental policy in Vietnam within protection of first amendment's Free Speech Clause), and fundamental privacy rights, see cases cited supra note 55.
The constitutional rights of children are not, however, coextensive with those of adults. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 214 n.11 (Stewart, J., concurring) . See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 622, 623 (constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults because: (1) children have "peculiar vulnerability"; (2) children have "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner"; (3) "the importance of the parental role in child rearing.").
95. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) ("It is not disputed that a child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment . . . ."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1967) (liberty interest of child demands procedural due process safeguards before confinement in institution for juvenile delinquents).
of reasonable care and safety, in freedom from restraint, and in such training as may be required by these interests. 9 "
The protection of these interests should rest with the child's parents and not the state. Placing one's child in a state health care facility is not equivalent to a finding of abuse or neglect, which is necessary to terminate parental rights and to shift the protection of these interests elsewhere.
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Such a placement is also not equivalent to a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, as is the case when parents put a child up for adoption. 9 " While the constitutional rights of children may sometimes conflict with those of parents, as in a minor's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, 99 in the residential care situation parents and child have the same interest in seeing that the child gets the best care possible. Habilitation choices are the kind of choices parents traditionally make for their children, and retarded children should have a right to have their parents, and not other adults, make them. 0 0
C. The State's Interests
The state has interests in the family, as well as in the operation of its institutions, which may impinge upon the rights of children and parents. Its most important interest in the context of parental habilitation decision-96. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) ; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (liberty interest of minor child whose parents sought state-administered mental health care for him, when added to risk of error in commitment process, prevents parents from having absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to institutionalize him). The parental right at issue in Parham is different than the parental right to make habilitation decisions. Parham concerned the decision to institutionalize a child. A parental habilitation decision does not arise until after the institutionalization decision has been made and, thus, the state should already have acted to confine use of its health facilities to cases of genuine need. This Note concerns a mentally retarded child who is already in residential care, and whose liberty interest against commitment has already been protected.
97. See supra notes 3 and 83. There is no evidence that professional training succeeds in creating a universalistic moral neutrality. On the contrary, we are on much safer ground to assume that those engaged in dispensing professional services (or any other services) will apply the evaluations of social worth common to their culture and will modify their services with respect to those evaluations unless discouraged from doing so by the organizational arrangements under which they work (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
making, however, is helping parents care for the health and well-being of their children.
In the Family
Even though parental decisionmaking is often entitled to constitutional protection, "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest." 1 0 1 The state's power to regulate the family can derive from either its police power or parens patriae power.
The police power is the state's inherent power-once it has met procedural safeguards-to promote all aspects of public welfare or public safety. 10 2 With due process, the state can justify exercising its police power to control habilitation decisions only if this action would further a legitimate social goal 0 3 such as disqualifying unfit parents. This goal is not met, however, by disqualifying all parents with children in residential care because all these parents are not unfit to make habilitation decisions.' Thus, this disqualification is overinclusive: It so disadvantages individual parents as to outweigh the benefit of disqualifying some parents who are actually unfit.
Under its parens patriae power, the state can advance-in certain circumstances-the interests of individuals, such as mentally incompetent adults, who lack the capacity to act in their own best interests." 5 Substan- 105. Parens patriae, which means "parent of the country," refers to the "role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLAcF's LAW DICrIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). Its origins in the English common law derive from the care of material interests of infants by the King's Chancellor, with the first mention of parens patriae in a case involving a child occurring in 1696. Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. Rav. 147, 166 (1970) . In the United States, the scope of the parens patriae power has been expanded beyond that which existed in England. See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972) (citing series of cases that "establish the right of a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to its 'quasi-sovereign interests."') Despite this expansion, parens patriae remains as troublesome a concept in America as it has been since its origins in England. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966) ("[I] ts meaning is murky and its historical credentials are of dubious relevance."); cf. Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078, 1080-83 (1828) (Lord Redesdale expresses his own doubts about tive due process bars the state, however, from exercising a parens patriae interest to make habilitation decisions for an institutionalized retarded child; the Constitution entrusts the child's own parents with the protection of this interest unless they have been disqualified with a judicial finding of unfitness."" 6 Procedural due process requires that the state show parental unfitness on a case-by-case basis;1 0 7 unless the state can do so, the child's own parents protect his best interests. The state's parens patriae interest here is in helping parents care for the health and well-being of their child. 08 It can serve this interest by improving the education and medical treatments given to retarded children" 0 " and by making counseling services available to parents." 0
In Its Institutions
The Supreme Court allows states "considerable discretion" in allocating resources towards the retarded people in state institutions."' This discretion follows from a state's significant interests in confining the use of its facilities to cases of genuine need," 2 in efficiently distributing the resources it allocates to the treatment of retarded children,"" and in ensurgrounds on which parens patriae is based, before concluding that it does not really matter because doctrine really does exist).
106. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (due process requires parens patriae legislation be "compatible with the best interests of the affected class"); cf. Developments-The Family, supra note 77, at 1225-26 (when acting under its parens patriae power state should advance only interests of child or incompetent person and not attempt to further collective goals, which can be supported only by use of its police power), and supra note 3.
107. See supra note 3. 
Cf S. PROVENCE & A. NAYLOR, WORKING wITH DISADVANTAGED PARENTS AND THEIR
CHILDREN: SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 4, 8 (1983) (by giving parents guidance, counseling and developmental evaluations of child, social workers protect and promote development of child "through a continuing and close association with his parents-a partnership in behalf of the child"). Psychoanalytic research shows that the psychological impact of the birth of a congenitally defective child can result in a mourning process for the lost child on the part of the mother. Solnit & Stark,
Mourning and the birth of a defective child, 16 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 523
(1961). The mother works through this process more easily when she has "an opportunity to review her thoughts and feelings about the wished-for child" and "an active role in planning for the child."
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1715 Vol. 94: , 1985 ing the security of others institutionalized in that facility. 114 A state's discretion in the employment of its resources when providing social services has not, however, justified infringement of constitutional rights.' 1 5
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also urged federal courts to show deference to the decisions of medical professionals and state agencies." 6 Nevertheless, this judicial deference towards professional decisionmaking in an institutional setting is unwarranted, and even dangerous, when it allows mental health workers to control habilitation decisions. It ignores the growing need for external review over narrowly based state bureaucracies that now act as substitute parents."' It denies that professional knowledge is only one of the determinants that impinge upon thinking about such choices as habilitation decisionmaking: " 8 Professionals do not always know best, and may even face pressures from which parents are free. 11 ' Most importantly, the long history of poor treatment that mentally retarded citizens have received in the United States argues against deference towards professionals in this area."' This constitutional analysis suggests that parents have significant interests in the care and treatment that their institutionalized mentally retarded child receives, and that these interests in many cases may outweigh the interests of the state. There are, thus, grave infirmities in the way almost all states deal with habilitation decisionmaking. The states that fall to involve parents at all"' engage in a "[pirocedure by presumption" against which the Supreme Court has said the Bill of Rights in general and the due process clause in particular were designed to protect."' Furthermore, those states that fall to involve parents adequately violate the substantive, constitutional rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
IV.
ONE STANDARD ARTICULATED A number of possible approaches to habilitation decisionmaking are possible under the Constitution. This Note will propose one appropriate for state statutes.
A. Reliance on Parental Decisionmaking
Rather than selectively involving some parents, states should allow all parents to become involved, if they want to be, in developing the habilitation plan of their institutionalized child. Doctors, staff members, and the parents of the child should develop the IHP in careful conversations. As members of the habilitation team, parents should be encouraged to partici-
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See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (professionals at institutions for mentally retarded persons "are part of a team and statewide structure" and may feel "desire to comply with budgetary pressures and statewide standards" which will cause "a yielding of professional judgment to personal career perspectives"); S.
SARANSON & J. DORIS, EDUCATIONAL HANDICAPS, PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL HISTORY 89, 94
(1979) (all institutions for mentally retarded citizens, including community-based centers, are part of political system "intended to serve the community, not to upset it, and heads of public institutions and agencies know this well").
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